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Government guarantees of private debt deplete equity. The depletion is greatest during periods when
the probability of a guarantee payoff is highest. In a setting otherwise subject to Modigliani-Miller
neutrality, firms issue guaranteed debt up to the limit the government permits. Declines in asset values
raise debt in relation to asset values and thus deplete equity directly, under the realistic assumption
that the government is unable to enforce rules calling for marking asset values to market. Less widely
recognized is that guaranteed debt creates an incentive to pay equity out to owners — such a payout
lowers the value of the firm's call option on its assets by less than the amount of the payout. I build
a simple dynamic equilibrium model of an economy that would have a constant consumption/capital
ratio but for debt guarantees. Exogenous changes in asset values cause major swings in allocations
as participants respond to changing incentives. Periods when default is unusually likely because asset
values have fallen are times of abnormally high consumption/capital ratios. The withdrawal of equity
from firms to pay for the consumption will turn out to be free on the margin if the firm defaults. Consumers
concentrate their consumption during the periods when consumption is cheap. Because these periods
are transitory, they generate expectations of negative consumption growth, which implies that interest
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In modern economies, the government guarantees the debt of many borrowers. In a few
cases, the promise is explicit; in others it is implicit but known to be likely; and in others,
the guarantee occurs because the alternative is immediate collapse, with substantial harm
to the rest of the economy. The modern government cannot stop itself from making good
on the obligations of many borrowers, large and small. I demonstrate that debt guarantees
deplete equity from rms at times of declines in asset values. Not only do rms fail to replace
equity lost when leveraged portfolios lose value, but they have an incentive to deplete equity
further, by paying unusually high dividends.
The government adopts a safeguard to protect the taxpayers against the worst abuses
of guarantees|it imposes a capital requirement to limit the ratio of guaranteed debt to the
value of the underlying collateral.
In the United States, organizations with explicit guarantees on some debt (deposits) are
mainly banks. The non-deposit obligations of banks and other intermediaries, notably the
two huge mortgage-holders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, enjoy market values that only
make sense on the expectation of a government guarantee. The recent interventions to avert
the collapse of Bear Stearns and AIG conrmed that the government will pay o on private
debt obligations in times of stress even in sectors distant from any formal debt guarantees.
The Federal Housing Administration guarantees the debt of individual mortgage borrowers;
the government is extending this guarantee to a larger set of individual borrowers under
pressure from declining housing prices. Almost any borrower faces some probability that
adverse future events will result in the government repaying the borrower's debt.
A key issue is the withdrawal of equity capital from rms with guaranteed debt|the
phenomenon I call equity depletion. A counterpart is the unwillingness of investors to supply
equity to rms that face positive probabilities of insolvency and payos on government
guarantees. Equity depletion rises along with the probability of default. Withdrawing equity
from a rm in one period has zero marginal cost in states next period where default occurs
and the government pays o on guaranteed debt|the value of equity claims is zero in those
states. If a larger fraction of future states have zero equity value, the expected payo to
equity investments this period declines. In a partial equilibrium setting, this factor would
result in knife-edge behavior|the owners of a rm would pay out all of the equity value
of a rm as a dividend so as to maximize the value of the government bailout. Akerlof
2and Romer (1993) describe actions of this type leading up to the savings and loan crisis in
the U.S. in the 1980s. In the model of this paper, however, a countervailing force limits
the depletion of capital. Any injection of equity to rms in general comes from reduced
consumption and any removal of capital takes the form of a consumption binge. With a
non-zero value of the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, the desire to
smooth consumption keeps equity ows into and out of rms at nite rates. But consumption
does rise substantially in periods when expected defaults and accompanying bailouts become
more likely.
The paper reaches these conclusions in a simple general-equilibrium model. Capital is
the only factor of production; output is proportional to capital. The real return to capital
is a random variable. Each period, consumers decide between consuming and saving. The
government guarantees debt secured by capital. If the borrower's capital falls far enough,
because of negative returns, the rm may default because its quantity of capital falls below
the amount of its debt.
I characterize the limitations on the government's debt guarantee in what I believe is
a realistic way. The government enforces a capital requirement: At the time a company
issues debt, the amount borrowed may not exceed a specied fraction of the rm's capital.
The remaining value is the borrower's equity, sucient to meet the capital requirement. If
the return is negative enough so that the new quantity of capital falls short of the value of
the debt, the government makes up the dierence. The lender receives a payment of the
dierence. Equity shareholders in the rm receive nothing back when default occurs and the
government pays o.
My characterization of the government's capital requirement has an important dynamic
element: If the quantity of capital falls, but not enough to push the borrower into insolvency,
the borrower may keep debt at its earlier level. The government fails to follow the principle
of prompt corrective action. Under that principle, the borrower would mark its collateral to
market and could borrow only the specied fraction of the new, lower value of the collateral.
Instead, the government acts as if the collateral had its historical value and permits the
borrower to keep the historical level of debt, which the government guarantees.
Figure 1 shows the operation of the model in an example of 50 years of experience. The
upper panel shows the cumulative return to capital, the exogenous driving force of the model,
the only source of departures from a smooth growth path. The upper panel also shows a key
3variable of the model, the fraction of the value of capital nanced by equity. In periods when
the return is positive, the fraction is about 30 percent, reecting the government's capital
requirement of that amount. But when returns are negative, equity depletion occurs|the
equity fraction declines. One reason is the government's rule that rms may keep debt at its
previous level even capital declines . Capital requirements are based on the book value of
assets, not the current value. But another reason is the incentive for rms to increase their
payouts when default looms.
In the 50-year history shown in the gure, default occurs twice. In the rst one, several
consecutive negative returns cause severe equity depletion, followed by default. In the second
default, consecutive shocks deplete equity less severely, and equity depletion is smaller, but
default does occur. In the middle of the 50 years, a group of negative returns depresses
equity to about 5 percent of capital but does not cause default.
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the resulting volatility in the consumption/capital
ratio and in the interest rate on safe debt. Consumption rises whenever equity depletion
occurs from negative returns. Consumption remains high as long as equity is positive and
below normal. Consumers perceive that extracting equity from rms and consuming it may
be free in a year when default is unusually likely, because the increased guarantee pays
for the consumption should default occur. Consumption is strongly mean-reverting in this
economy. When consumption is high, it will probably decline next year either because a
positive return returns equity to normal or because a negative return will cause default,
in which case consumption also returns to normal. Thus periods of depleted equity are
also periods of negative expected consumption growth. The interest rate tracks expected
consumption growth. As the gure shows, the interest rate falls dramatically to negative
levels during periods of depleted equity.
It should go without saying that the model in this paper falls short of capturing reality.
It makes no claim to portray the actual events in nancial markets in 2007 and 2008. Rather,
it is a full working out of the implications in a fairly standard model of one important feature
of nancial markets, widespread government guarantees of debt.
2 Options
Black and Scholes (1973) identied an incentive for equity depletion for a rm with non-
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Figure 1: Example of a History From the Model
5with an exercise price equal to the face value of the debt. If the rm depletes equity by, for
example, paying a dividend of $1, the shareholders gain $1 in hand but lose less than $1. The
 of the option|the derivative of its value with respect to the value of the rm's assets|is
less than one. Hence it would appear that the shareholders have an unlimited incentive to
deplete equity. But every dollar the shareholders gain is a dollar lost by the bondholders.
Black and Scholes went on to observe that bondholders have contractual protections against
this conduct.
Equity depletion without a debt guarantee is the result of exploitation of bondholders
by shareholders. If investors all held shares and bonds in the same proportion, the incentive
for equity depletion would not exist. Equity depletion arising from the incentive identied
by Black and Scholes is the result of agency frictions between shareholders and bondholders.
This paper is not about that incentive. I assume a frictionless solution to the potential
agency problem.
With guaranteed debt, the Black-Scholes analysis continues to hold|paying out $1 in
dividends lowers the value of the shareholders' call option by less than $1. The guarantee
immunizes the bondholders from any loss, however. The shareholders capture extra value
not from the bondholders but from the government. Equity depletion appears to be an
unlimited opportunity to steal from the government.
Just as the bondholders have at least some contractual protection in the case of non-
guaranteed debt, the government, in the model developed here, imposes restrictions on equity
depletion. In particular, rms cannot steal directly by paying out such high dividends that
debt exceeds the current value of assets. Firms may only gamble that a decline in asset
values next period will trigger a guarantee payment. But it turns out that this constraint
rarely binds. In the aggregate, equity depletion requires increased consumption. With a
reasonable value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, consumers' desire to smooth
consumption limits equity depletion, though equilibrium consumption in the model is quite
volatile.
3 Model
3.1 Basic stochastic growth model
Capital K is the only factor of production. The return ratio for capital is the random variable
A, so one unit of capital becomes A units of output at the beginning of the next period. The
6return ratio is exogenously, independently, and identically distributed over time. I will refer
to a value of A greater than one as a positive return and a value below one as a negative
return. I will also refer to a value below one as reducing the value of capital. Each person
consumes c. I let 0 (prime) denote next period's value of a variable. I denote state variables
with a ^ (hat). The state variable associated with capital is the quantity of output available
for reinvestment or consumption, ^ K. Its law of motion is
^ K
0 = A( ^ K   c) (1)
Consumers have power utility functions with coecient of relative risk aversion of  and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1=. Consumers solve the dynamic program,
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Here  is the consumer's discount ratio. The value function takes the form
V ( ^ K) = V ^ K
1 : (3)
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01 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The solution for the constant V does not have a closed form but is unique and computation-
ally benign. Notice that one could divide both sides by ^ K1  to eliminate capital as a state
variable, replacing c with ~ c = c= ^ K. Thus the model implies a constant consumption/capital
ratio.
Throughout the paper, I measure all values in consumption units.
3.2 Firms and consumers
The basic growth model has constant returns to scale, so the boundaries of the rm are
indeterminate. Without loss of generality, I assume that each consumer has an equity interest
in one rm. The consumer's claims on the rm are a mixture of a one-period debt claims
and a residual equity claim. The consumer makes all decisions for the rm, including the
level of capital and the amount of debt. In the absence of government guarantees on the
debt, the rm satises the Modigliani-Miller property of indierence to the mix of debt and
equity.
73.3 Government
The government guarantees debt secured by capital. If the return next period is suciently
negative to make capital less than the debt, the government pays the shortfall. The payout
is the dierence between the amount of debt and the amount of the collateral capital|the
usual amount of a government payment for defaulted guaranteed debt or the cost of a bailout.
The guarantee includes interest due on the debt, provided the interest rate is the economy's
rate for default-free one-year obligations.
The government enforces capital requirements to limit its exposure. At the beginning
of a period, the consumer invests debt and equity in the rm, which the rm uses to buy
capital. The standard capital requirement limits debt to a fraction 1   of the value of the
capital held. But there is an exception and an exception to the exception. The exception is
that rms may have higher leverage if the debt they bring into a period exceeds the fraction
1    of the value of the capital. In that case they may keep debt at its previous level but
may not take on any additional debt. The government forbears action against still-solvent
rms that are in violation of the capital requirement. The exception to the exception is that
debt may never exceed the value of the capital|the rm must be solvent during the period.
In principle, capital requirements for rms selling guaranteed debt often have the objec-
tive of disciplining rms that are solvent but lack all of the required capital, according to the
doctrine of prompt corrective action (see Kocherlakota and Shim (2007) for an analysis of
the doctrine that covers rather dierent issues from this paper). The obstacles to enforcing
marking to market are serious, however. Asset valuations tend to use historical rather than
market values. If the government pushes guaranteed borrowers to mark their portfolios to
market, the borrowers shift to assets that defy reliable valuation. Financial institutions are
remarkably willing and able to create these assets, as recent experience has shown.
When a rm becomes insolvent because a decline in the asset value lowers the value of
capital below the value of debt, the government makes its payo. The rm starts the next
year without any legacy debt. Its new debt is constrained by the normal capital requirement.
The Modigliani-Miller property applies to any non-guaranteed debt the rm might issue.
Such debt would have no eect on allocations in the model. For simplicity, I assume that
rms issue only guaranteed debt.
In addition to capital requirements, I assume that the government can prevent specializa-
tion among rms that increases the government's exposure to payouts on debt guarantees.
8The danger is that some rms will pay out dividends to the point of borderline current
solvency and that consumers, having reached the point where they prefer not to consume
the dividends, invest them in another group of rms that are debt-free. I constrain all
rms to have the same capital structures. The model would behave much the same way if
specialization were permitted, but I exclude it to simplify the exposition.
The government nances the payments to honor its debt guarantees from a lump-sum tax,
. The eects from the guarantee are accordingly pure substitution eects. The government
balances its budget separately for each value of the state variables of the model and for each
realization of the random return to capital.
3.4 Flows and returns
Debt pays an interest rate of rd. I discuss the determination of this rate in a later section.
Because the government guarantee of debt is a giveaway, the consumer always lends the
maximum permissible amount, which I write as
D = min(K;max( ^ D;(1   )K)): (5)
Here D is the amount to be repaid, including interest and ^ D is the legacy from last year's
debt that might permit a higher level of debt to be held this year. The quantity K = ^ K  c
is the value of the capital the rm will carry through the period, The outside min enforces
the solvency requirement during the year, the exception to the exception. The quantity
(1   )K is the standard capital requirement, but the max grants the exception for legacy
shadow debt, ^ D. The consumer invests D=(1+rd) at the beginning of the year and receives
D at the end of the year. Note that the capital requirement applies to the interest to be
paid as well as the principal.
The consumer holds equity, Q, in the amount




at the beginning of the year, to make up the total assets of the rm, K, at the beginning of
the year. The return the consumer earns on the equity investment is
max(AK   D;0): (7)
This is the residual after payment of interest and principal.
93.5 Consolidating consumers and rms
To study the allocations in the model, I consolidate each consumer with the corresponding
rm. The decisions the consumer makes directly as the manager of the consolidated entity are
the same as those that would occur under any ecient alternative managerial arrangement
that operated the rm on behalf of its stakeholders. The allocations in the economy are the
same when each rm is aliated with one consumer as they would be if rms and consumers
participated in capital and product markets, because of constant returns.
If the government did not guarantee debt, consumers would solve the dynamic program
of equation (4). The debt guarantee gives the consumer an opportunity to capture additional
value from the government payo for default. The consolidated entity does not care about
default itself, as it is a gain to the rm just oset by the loss to the consumer, but it does
gain from the payment that the government makes when guaranteed debt defaults. Suppose
rst that the return ratio A is enough to pay o all the debt and interest. Then the combined
return to the consumer is AK, the sum of the face value of debt and interest, D, and the
return to equity in equation (7). Now suppose that the return is low enough that default
occurs so that equity gets nothing and debt receives D in the form of the value of the capital
AK and a guarantee payment G = D   AK. The consumer's combined return is AK + G.
The only substantive eect of the guarantee is to add value not otherwise attainable when
the asset value falls enough to trigger default. The optimizing consumer arranges to capture
this value by taking on as much debt as possible. The availability of the subsidy has striking
eects on the consumer's incentives to save and consume.
3.6 Consumer decision-making
A consumer has two state variables, total debt ^ D and the quantity of capital ^ K. At the
beginning of a period, the consumer chooses a level of debt, D, to apply during the period
and a level of consumption, c. The consumer always lends the maximum permissible amount
in equation (5). The consumer invests K = ^ K   c in the rm for the period.
The indicator variable z0 takes the value one of default occurs next period and zero if
not. The law of motion for capital is
^ K









Under solvency in the next period, the consumer earns the return AK for the capital K held
10during the period. Under insolvency, the new quantity of capital is the defaulted debt|the
government makes up the dierence between the actual amount of capital and the real value
of the debt, so total capital is the real value of the debt. The tax payment ( ^ D= ^ K;A) ^ K is a
function of the state variables and the realization of the return, A, so that the government's
budget can be balanced in each possible outcome.
The law of motion for the debt legacy is
^ D
0 = (1   z
0)D: (9)
Legacy debt at the beginning of a period is the amount held through the earlier period unless
the consumer defaults, in which case it becomes zero.























I use the standard values of  = 2 for the coecient of relative risk aversion and  = 0:95 for
the discount ratio. I take the annual return ratio of capital to be log normal with log-mean
 = 0:04 and log-standard deviation  = 0:1, truncated at the rst and 99th percentiles.
Figure 2 shows the density of the distribution. I take the capital requirement to be  = 30
percent.
5 Equilibrium
I will generally discuss the equilibrium of the model in terms of the ratio of consumption to
the capital stock, c= ^ K, and the ratio of debt to the value of the capital stock, ^ D= ^ K. Recall
that in the basic growth model without debt guarantees, c= ^ K is constant.
At a time when legacy debt is low|just after default or following a positive return|the
consumer will choose a value of debt controlled by the (1   )K in equation (5). If the
return is positive in the next period, the consumer faces the same constraint and makes the
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Figure 2: Density of Annual Return Ratio
keeping the old value of debt, ^ D. The ratio ^ D= ^ K, the consumer's debt-related state variable,
is correspondingly higher. Because the consumer is closer to insolvency, the probability of
default next period rises. This change triggers the key behavioral response of the model.



























shows that when z0 = 1 and the consumer defaults, consumption turns out to have been free
on the margin. The understanding of the possibility that consumption will turn out to be
free results in a higher consumption choice before z0 is realized. As random negative returns
push the consumer into higher values of ^ D= ^ K, consumption rises.
The consumer's Euler equation is instructive on this point. Suppose that neither the reg-
ular capital requirement nor the exception to the exception capital requirement is binding,
so the exception permitting the carrying forward of legacy debt is in eect|see equation (5).
Consider the standard variational argument where the consumer reduces current consump-
tion by a small amount, saves that amount for one year, and then consumes that amount
12plus its earnings for the year. This variation has no implications for the level of debt. Let
c0 be the level of consumption next year when the return A is known. Also let f(A) be the







Here A is the value of the return ratio separating solvency from default. The Euler equation
diers from the standard one only in the truncation of the integral on the left side. The
omission of part of the distribution of marginal utility on the left, for the cases where the
bailout makes consumption free, results in a lower current marginal utility and thus a higher
level of current consumption. The consumer chooses high current consumption and plans
that consumption will fall in the next year, on the average.
To nd an equilibrium of the model, I approximate the consumer's value function V ( ^ D= ^ K)
as piecewise linear on a lattice of 200 knots of values of ^ D= ^ K. I approximate the truncated
log-normal distribution of A by assigning probability 0.01 to each of the quantiles of the
distribution running from 1/101 to 100/101, the truncation points. I start with an arbitrary
tax function dened as a matrix of values whose rows correspond to the lattice values of
the state variable and whose columns correspond to the 100 values of A. Then I solve the
dynamic program given the tax function, by value-function iteration. Next I update the tax
function to be the amounts of the guarantee paid out in each state and realization of A. I
iterate this process to convergence, which is rapid.
The model implies a Marko transition process for the nancial position of the consumer
as measured by ^ D= ^ K. Figure 3 shows the stationary distribution of the process. I approxi-
mate the process by a 200-state version and then aggregate to the bins shown in the gure.
About half the time, ^ D= ^ K is at or below the notional limit of 70 percent. Although con-
sumers will move up to the 70-percent level in any period when ^ D= ^ K falls below 70 percent,
positive returns are common and large, so the state variable is often below 70 percent be-
cause the most recent return was positive. For 5.5 percent of the time, consumers have no
legacy debt because they defaulted in the previous period. For the other half of the time,
consumers have higher leverage than 70 percent because the cumulative return to capital is
below its previous peak and the legacy exception permits the extra debt.
Figure 4 shows the consumer's choice of debt for the coming period, D, which I normalize
as D= ^ K. Much of the time the choice is (1  )K, the 70 percent mentioned above. This is
















































































































Leverage Ratio Coming into Period
Figure 3: Distribution of Leverage Ratio
legacy exception. Whenever the return is negative, the consumer is eligible for the legacy
exception, either as a continuation and extension of the exception or for the rst time. In
years following multiple negative returns, consumers may enjoy values of the leverage ratio
D= ^ K close to its upper limit of almost exactly one|the exception to the exception, where
D= ^ K = (1   c= ^ K).
Figure 5 shows the probability of default conditional on the leverage ratio. It rises
monotonically to its highest possible level of 35 percent.
Figure 6 shows how consumption responds to the state of the economy. In the region
of the legacy exception (0:703  ^ D= ^ K  0:987) consumption rises with the leverage ratio
because the probability of default rises, making consumption this period cheaper because
the government nances it when default occurs. At the highest values of the debt ratio,
consumption is much lower, because of the exception to the exception requiring solvency
during the period.
5.1 interest rate on debt
The interest rate on debt, rd, satises the consumption CAPM asset-pricing condition,
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Leverage Ratio Coming into the Year





































































































































Leverage Ratio Coming into the Year
Figure 6: Consumption/Capital Ratio as a Function of the Leverage Ratio
As usual in the consumption CAPM, the rate varies positively with expected consumption
growth. It also varies because consumption growth covaries with A (the conditional distribu-
tion of A is invariant but the conditional distribution of c0
c varies by current state). Figure 7
shows expected consumption growth as a function of the nancial condition of the consumer.
Consumption hardly changes at all when the consumer is in the post-default state, so the
expected growth rate in that state is essentially zero. Consumers near or below their capital
requirements expect consumption to grow, as there is a chance that they will move next
year into a more leveraged position where a higher level of consumption is optimal. But
once consumers reach higher leverage, they face the high likelihood of default with a sharp
drop of consumption back to the normal leverage level, so expected consumption growth is
negative.
Figure 8 shows the interest rate on guaranteed debt as a function of leverage. When
leverage is low, the rate is 13 percent|5 percent real return to capital plus 4 percent expected
ination plus about 4 percent from expected consumption growth. As long as leverage does
not exceed 85 percent, the rate remains above 3 percent. For higher amounts of leverage,
the force of expected declines in consumption takes over. Above 90 percent leverage, the
rate becomes negative as participants know that default and the accompanying resumption
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Leverage Ratio Coming into the Year
Figure 8: Interest Rate as a Function of the Leverage Ratio
175.2 Return to equity
The equity investment Q = pK   D=(1 + rd) in one period pays o
(1 + rQ)Q = max(AK   D;0): (14)










In one year, after consuming the amount c, the owner lends the rm D=(1+rd) and provides
equity Q which adds up to capital worth K in the hands of the rm. Production AK occurs
before the next year. The rm pays this amount to its owner as the return of borrowed
funds, interest on those funds at rate rd, and the payout of the owner's residual equity, if the
rm has not defaulted. The government makes up the dierence to the owner if AK falls
short of D. The model generates matrices of ows, indexed by the state of the economy in
the rst year, ^ D= ^ K, and by the random return A. I describe these matrices in two ways.
First, Figure 9 shows the expectation of the ratio of the ows to the original value of
capital, ^ K. The horizontal axis shows ^ D= ^ K, the debt legacy, as a ratio to the value of capital
brought into the period. If the legacy leverage ratio is less than the notional upper limit
of 1   , 70 percent, the consumer lends the rm 70 percent of the value of the capital,
(1   )( ^ K   c). Default has a low probability, so the rm is able to repay the debt with
interest, as shown in the top line, and to return the consumer's equity at a level with a
reasonable return. The expected government guarantee payment, shown at the bottom, is
zero. The rm issues new debt and new equity with values somewhat below the amounts
returned, reecting the interest and return to equity from the earlier investments. The
expected net outow, shown close to the bottom, is the expected value of the consumer's
consumption at the beginning of the new period.
On the right side of Figure 9, the consumer benets from the exception for legacy debt.
Earlier negative returns have left the consumer with the right to issue more debt to replace
the high level of legacy debt. The rising lines show the expected repayment of debt including
interest and the expected issuance of new debt. Their upward slope reects the higher value


















































Figure 9: Expected Flows as Functions of the Leverage Ratio
return of equity and issuance of new equity decline with leverage. Equity depletion is visible
as the excess of expected new debt over repayment of debt and the shortfall of new equity
over the return of equity. Notice that the net outow, equal to consumption, is essentially
at. Here, consumption next year is stated as a ratio to the value brought into this year;
it is not next year's consumption/capital ratio, which is shown in Figure 6. The rise in the
consumption/capital ratio that occurs when the consumer moves closer to default is largely
oset by the fact that the move occurs when returns are negative, which lowers next year's
capital. The ratio rises, but the actual amount of consumption remains about the same.
The second view of the matrix of ows is along one row, showing the various possible
outcomes at a given level of prior leverage. Figure 10 plots the ows with the asset return
ratio on the horizontal axis and the ows as fractions of the earlier value of capital on the
vertical axis, for ^ D= ^ K = 0:85. For consistency with the other plots in the paper, where
declines in asset values move the economy to the right, the horizontal axis has a high new
value on the left and a low new value on the right. The left side of the gure shows what
happens when the economy retreats from high leverage because the asset value rises. No
default occurs, so all debt is repaid with interest. Newly issued debt is about equal to debt













































Figure 10: Flows as Functions of the Asset Return Ratio when Prior Leverage is 0.85
impending decline in consumption|see Figure 8. Now an obligation to repay principal and
interest at the end of the year yields more than a dollar of current funds for each dollar
returned at the end of the year. New debt issuance rises to a peak, oset by a reduction
in equity. Firms are borrowing heavily and paying out the proceeds as dividends or share
repurchases. Consumption remains constant, but the consumption/capital ratio rises, as
shown in Figure 6. Farther to the right of Figure 10, default occurs. Repayment of debt
drops because the rm's collateral has fallen below the face-value of debt and interest. The
guarantee payment rises. New debt is below the level on the left, because the rm loses
its legacy right to issue more debt upon default and is limited by its now lower amount of
capital. Issuance of equity makes up the dierence.
5.4 Equity depletion
Equity depletion occurs when a decline in the asset value causes the probability of default
to rise. Figure 10 shows how depletion occurs. If the asset value falls, the rm pays out
a substantial amount of equity. Most is replaced by corresponding debt investment. Two
factors account for the equity outow that is replaced by debt. First is the compelling
advantage of leverage when the government guarantees debt. From the joint perspective of
20the rm and investor, debt is unambiguously a good thing and the rm is always at a corner
solution with maximum permissible guaranteed debt. A fall in the asset value relaxes the
debt constraint because it lowers the interest rate. The rm immediately borrows up to the
new, higher limit. Recall that the amount borrowed is D=(1+rd). The rm then pays out the
dierence as dividends and thereby reduces equity. The second factor is that investors reduce
their total funding when the asset value falls, because they increase consumption. The new
level of funding to the rm is ( ^ K0   c0) and c0 rises when A0 is less than one. Although the
decline in total funds available is small relative to the shift from equity to debt, the increase
in consumption is critical to the process, because the rise in consumption as rms approach
default creates a decrease in expected consumption growth and thus the lower interest rate
that permits the expansion of debt.
6 Roles of Key Parameters
Figure 11 compares economies with dierent values of the key parameters, in terms of the
way consumption depends on the leverage state variable, ^ D=(p ^ K). The rst case is a capital
requirement of  = 0:1 instead of 0.3 as in the base case. Firms coming into the year with
leverage less than 90 percent immediately issue debt up to that point. The behavior of
consumption is dierent from the base case only in the region where the base-case consumer
is levered beyond the basic 70 percent level but less than the 90 pecent level that is advanta-
geous to the consumer in the economy with lower capital requirements. In interpreting this
nding, one should keep in mind that these are substitution eects. The actual amounts of
guarantee payos are much higher with the lower capital requirement, but these are taxed
away.
The second case is less risk aversion and higher intertemporal substitution|specically,
a value of the curvature parameter  of 1.1 in place of its value of 2 in the base case.
Higher substitution greatly increases the volatility of consumption. Consumers concentrate
their spending in times of cheap consumption to a greater extent, so consumption is lower
when leverage is at or below the capital requirement and higher when leverage is higher and
the probability of default is higher, so consumption is cheaper in expectation. Notice that
the consumption/capital ratio is always higher for the economy with more intertemporal
substitution. As a result, its endogenous growth rate is lower.























































Figure 11: Comparison of Consumption as a Function of Leverage for Four Cases
return ratio, A, to 0.05. The result is, as expected, lower volatility of the consumption/capital
ratio.
Volatility in other variables follows closely from the volatility in consumption shown in
Figure 11. In particular, movements in the interest rate track expected consumption growth,
which is more volatile when intertemporal substitution is higher ( is lower), but less volatile
with lower asset-return volatility.
7 Concluding Remarks
The essential feature of a government guarantee of debt that yields the results in this paper
is the government's failure to take prompt corrective action. Asset-value declines permit
higher leverage, with a higher probability of government payo. The consumption bulge
that is the source of the volatility would not occur if the government insisted on equity
contributions to make up for asset-value declines so as to keep leverage constant. Thus
the relevance of the basic mechanism studied in this paper to modern economic instability
rests on the government's failure to measure the market value of the collateral backing
guaranteed debt and the government's resulting failure to require equity infusions following
22negative returns. My impression is that these failures are the rule. Many organizations
enjoying eective guarantees, such as investment banks, do not even have stated capital
requirements. Financial intermediaries have shown great ingenuity in creating instruments
that defy current valuation.
Government guarantees are only one of many issues raised by recent nancial events. The
point of this paper is to pursue the eects of guarantees in a dynamic general-equilibrium
setting. Guarantees introduce volatility in key variables in an economy that would otherwise
evolve smoothly. In particular, if the government administers guarantees in terms of nominal
measures, then otherwise neutral nominal developments have profound real eects.
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